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*Prenomination Candidate Choice and General Election Behavior: Iowa Presidential Activists in 1980**

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Based on a two-wave survey of presidential activists in Iowa, this study examines the tension parties face between the nomination and general election phases of the presidential selection process. Activists who supported the losing contender for their party's nomination tended to participate less in the fall presidential campaign than supporters of the nomination winners. Kennedy supporters were as active in state and local races as Carter supporters among the Democrats surveyed, but Bush partisans were less active on behalf of the GOP Senate candidate in Iowa than were supporters of Ronald Reagan. These effects of prenomination presidential preference persist when controls for ideology, attachment to the party organization, and past levels of activity are imposed. The data indicate the 1980 prenomination contest had negative consequences for both presidential nominees—consequences best understood as linked to personal loyalty to the losing candidates, rather than to ideological preferences.

Scholars have linked reforms of the presidential nomination process since 1968 to the decline of party organizations in American politics. In particular, the growth of primaries as a mechanism for selecting presidential candidates has meant a proliferation of candidates, a greatly extended presidential campaign, and a further fragmentation of the parties. Writing well before the wave of reform which swept the prenomination process in the 1970s, V. O. Key (1958) lamented the effect of primaries on the party organizations: "The general adoption of the direct primary opened the road for disruptive forces that gradually fractionalized the party organization. By permitting more effective direct appeals by individual politicians to the party membership, the primary system freed forces driving toward the disintegration of party organizations and the construction of factions and cliques attached to the ambitions of individual leaders" (p. 376). Contemporary scholars tend to agree with Key, pointing out that the process of reform has accelerated the decline of the party organizations (Sorauf, 1980; Epstein, 1982).

The proliferation of presidential primaries has very likely affected nomination politics even in states which do not rely upon the primary. For example, due to the length of the campaign and the attention devoted to the nomination races in the national media, the Iowa campaign for a handful of national convention delegates has national significance. While Key (1958, p. 413) observed rather sharp

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differences between the party organizations in primary as compared with caucus-convention states, Sorauf, writing more recently, emphasized the similarities between the two methods, primarily because of the national character of contemporary nomination campaigns: "In short, we have had a convergence of the two delegate selection processes into a more lengthy, more homogeneous, more important, and more expensive preconvention politics" (Sorauf, 1980, p. 273). (Cf. Marshall, 1978, 1979; Farah, Jennings, and Miller, 1981.)

This study examines the effects of the 1980 presidential nomination campaigns in both political parties by studying the attitudes and behaviors of a sample of Iowa presidential activists before and after the national nominating conventions. Leading candidates in both parties pressed their campaigns in Iowa with the potential for many of the problems Key observed in the primaries of his day, even though Iowa uses the caucus-convention method of selecting national convention delegates. Indeed, the literature on activists participating in presidential nominations has strongly suggested that activists' concerns with ideological interests and candidate loyalty have increased the tension between the pre- and postnomination stages of the process (Polsby and Wildavsky, 1980; Soule and Clarke, 1970; Soule and McGrath, 1975; Kirkpatrick, 1976; Sullivan, 1977-78; Wayne, 1981).

Much of the literature on nomination activists speculates on the consequences for the parties of prenomination attitudes and behavior without the benefit of indicators of postnomination involvement or noninvolvement by the same activists. Johnson and Gibson's (1974) study of Iowa congressional campaign activists is a notable exception. They found that activists who supported the primary loser were significantly less likely to work for the nomination winner than were those who had supported the nominee during the primary period. However, they did not uncover systematic evidence that the party organization as a whole was hurt by the divisive primary. For example, supporters of the losers were as likely to say that they would be active in the future as were supporters of the nominee. The Johnson and Gibson study bears replication and extension. For one thing, their conclusions suggest a tempering of the prevailing pessimism about the effects of the prenomination campaign on party organizations. More importantly, there are no studies of presidential activists with a comparable follow-up design.

There are several reasons for believing presidential activists who supported the losing candidate in the nomination race will be drawn back into the fray to work on behalf of their former opponent within the party. Sober reflection after the national conventions may cause them to realize their nonparticipation (petulant or otherwise) is only helping the cause of the opposing party. This may lead them to contribute to their party's campaign even when six months before, during the heated nomination fight, they appeared beyond reconciliation. By including his principal competitor for the 1980 GOP nomination on the ticket as the vice presidential nominee, Ronald Reagan followed a time-honored method of reconciling warring factions in presidential politics. Is it far-fetched to expect it to work, even in a period of relatively open, "amateur" nomination politics?

Despite the pressures activists may feel to help their party in the general election, there are also good reasons to believe supporters of the losing candidate for the nomination will withhold their support from the nomination winner, to the detriment of the nominee and the party. In 1980, John Anderson's dissatisfaction with the GOP nomination race led him to mount an independent campaign for the presidency, and he may have been an attractive alternative for many Democratic and Republican activists, even if their support was not enough to give him a credible run at the White House. As Sullivan (1977-78) has pointed out, the nature of the current nomination process seems to emphasize candidate loyalties and ideological divisions within the party: "The long pre-convention campaign can only serve to increase the psychological investment each delegate has in his/her candidate. These facts, we think, make it even more difficult for losers to accept the convention outcome and recommit their energies to the winner" (p. 637).

Design and Method

It is high time we begin to carry our understanding of the effects of pre-convention politics to a study of the general election behavior of presidential activists. This study is based upon a two-wave survey of party activists in Iowa during the 1980 presidential election and thus represents a start in that direction. Delegates to the 1980 Iowa presidential conventions in June were surveyed, and then recontacted with a follow-up questionnaire after the November election. My major concern was with the effect of prenomination candidate preference on activists' general election activity in the presidential campaign and on activity levels in other "subpresidential" Iowa campaigns. In addition, I examined several indicators of partisan support to get as clear a reading as possible of the effects of prenomination preference on the willingness of these activists to work for the parties. The design permits addressing these questions because activists were surveyed first in June of 1980, before the national nominating conventions, and then resurveyed after the November election.¹

Iowa is a particularly interesting setting for this research because of its first-in-the-nation precinct caucuses. Candidates and the national media invested considerable time and effort in the state during the late fall of 1979. In both parties there was substantial competition for the nomination, though one saw more of the Republican candidates because there were more of them competing at that point and because Jimmy Carter followed a Rose Garden strategy. Senator Edward Kennedy made several highly visible swings through the state. Ronald Reagan likewise campaigned in the state, and George Bush heavily emphasized his Iowa campaign, spending 27 full days there, traversing 87 of Iowa's 99 counties before the 21 January 1980 precinct caucuses.²

¹ A full description of the design, along with the questions used to measure the concepts mentioned in the text, is provided in the appendix.

² *Des Moines Register*, 16 January 1980, p. 11. The analysis throughout this article will focus upon the two major contenders for the nomination in each party.

Prenomination Indicators of Party Divisiveness

An examination of partisan divisiveness in Iowa prior to the national conventions suggests that the Democratic Party was more sharply divided by the Carter-Kennedy contest than were the Republicans by the Bush-Reagan fight. Indeed, this finding is not surprising given the conventional wisdom that a serious nomination challenge to a sitting president is likely to prove vitriolic for the party. Twenty percent of the Democratic delegates to the state convention said in June that they could not support a Carter candidacy were he renominated by the party, while fully 33 percent of the Democrats said they could not support Senator Kennedy if he received the nomination. Among the Republicans, only 12 percent said they could not support a Reagan candidacy, and 9 percent of the GOP delegates said they would not support George Bush were he to be nominated.

Activists were asked in the June wave of the survey to rank six candidates in order of preference for the presidency. The rankings included three candidates in each party.³ Among the Democrats ranking Carter as their first choice for president, only 36 percent said that Kennedy was their second choice. Fully 45 percent of the Carter Democrats ranked Kennedy fourth or lower in their rankings, preferring at least one of the Republicans listed in the presidential preference question to Senator Kennedy. Likewise, 27 percent of the Kennedy Democrats ranked Carter as their second choice for president, and 48 percent ranked at least one Republican ahead of President Carter.⁴ The contrast in the GOP results is stark. Among Republican activists ranking Reagan as their first choice, 89 percent ranked Bush as their second choice. Sixty-five percent of Bush supporters ranked Reagan as their second choice, and only 9 percent ranked Reagan below at least one Democratic candidate.

Left only with data from the preconvention period, we might conclude that the Democrats were sharply divided, while the Republicans survived their pre-nomination fight in Iowa with their unity relatively undisturbed. Since Bush was on the ticket with his former opponent for the nomination, the conclusion seems ironclad. We might be sympathetic to Carter's postelection claims that divisiveness resulting from the Kennedy challenge contributed mightily to his defeat. We can easily imagine the Kennedy activists, convinced of his prenomination critique of Carter as "just another Republican," failing to support their party's nominee after the convention. Just as easily, we can imagine the Bush activists, placated by the vice presidential slot for their candidate and rejuvenated by the celebration of party unity in Detroit, actively participating in the fall campaign to defeat Jimmy Carter.

³ The Democratic candidates activists were asked to rank were Brown, Carter, and Kennedy. The Republican candidates were Anderson, Bush, and Reagan. Activists in both parties ranked all six candidates.

⁴ Fifteen percent of the Carter Democrats ranked Bush as their second choice for president, and 35 percent ranked Anderson as their second choice. Among the Kennedy Democrats, only 4 percent ranked Bush as their second choice, but 40 percent gave John Anderson their second ranking.

The Postnomination Stage

Fortunately, we can move beyond conjecture based upon prenomination indicators of partisan divisiveness. The way in which we shall examine the relationship between the nomination and general election stages of the 1980 campaign is by looking for an effect of prenomination candidate preference on activity in the second stage. Of particular interest is the extent to which Kennedy Democrats and Bush Republicans participated on behalf of their party's nominee. We might also expect ideology to have an effect, particularly given the literature which suggests the heightened role of ideology in the postreform parties. As an example, Kennedy activists who felt their candidate was ideologically more congenial than Carter might have had more difficulty transferring their loyalties to Carter after the convention than those who supported Kennedy despite being ideologically closer to Carter. Finally, with Comer (1976), it is reasonable to expect that activists who are strongly attached to the party organization would be more likely to overcome their disappointment after supporting a loser in the nomination race than activists who are less concerned about the party organization.

We include a number of measures of participation in the general election campaign both on behalf of the presidential nominee (including voting, contributing money, and an index of campaign activities) and in other Iowa races. Since party organizations may be jeopardized if activist supporters of the nomination loser withdraw from partisan activity, several measures of commitment to the party quite apart from the merits of any particular campaign are included.

The Effects of Prenomination Candidate Preference

Table 1 presents the bivariate relationships between prenomination candidate preference and general election behavior among the Iowa activists.⁵ Kennedy Democrats and Bush Republicans were significantly less likely to become involved in the presidential campaign, to contribute money to the presidential effort, or to vote for their party's nominee than were the supporters of the winners in the preconvention races. Supporters of the nomination losers in both parties were also more likely to vote for John Anderson. Given the indicators of divisiveness during the nomination stage of the campaign, it is striking that the Bush Republicans were no more active on behalf of their party's presidential nominee than were the Kennedy Democrats. Apparently Reagan's ticket-balancing strategy of placing Bush on the ticket did not placate the Texan's Iowa supporters.

The data hint at some minor differences in rates of participation in the presidential campaign between the parties. Reagan supporters appear to have been slightly more supportive of their nominee than the Carter faction was of theirs, a

⁵ The presidential preference variable used throughout the analysis is a comparison of the preference rankings of the two major contenders for the nomination as measured in the preconvention wave. Thus, a Democrat who preferred Carter over Kennedy, even if his first choice for president was Jerry Brown, was counted as "preferring Carter." Running the analysis where only first choices are compared does not change the results, but does slightly reduce the number of cases available.

TABLE 1

Effects of Prenomination Candidate Preference on Postnomination Behavior

Activity	Democrats		Republicans	
	Prenomination Candidate Choice		Prenomination Candidate Choice	
	Carter (N = 287)	Kennedy (N = 166)	Reagan (N = 148)	Bush (N = 165)
<i>Presidential Level</i>				
Involved in campaign	68% (***)	48%	80% (***)	44%
Contributed money	63% (***)	38%	66% (***)	32%
Voted for nominee	91% (***)	65%	97% (***)	73%
Voted for Anderson	5%	20%	1%	18%
Mean presidential activity index score	1.29 (***)	0.42	1.36 (***)	0.31
<i>Subpresidential Level</i>				
Involved in Senate campaign	75% (***)	86%	79% (***)	43%
Contributed money	72% (**)	81%	69% (***)	34%
Mean Senate activity index score	1.76 (**)	2.79	1.88 (***)	0.48
Involved in House campaign	66% (*)	73%	68% (***)	52%
Contributed money to House campaign	68% (NS)	65%	57% (*)	49%
Involved in state legislature campaigns	60% (NS)	58%	56% (NS)	49%
Money to state legislature campaigns	50% (NS)	51%	42% (NS)	41%
<i>Indicators of Partisan Support</i>				
Contributed money to party	70% (NS)	67%	73% (**)	62%
Rated party "very favorable"	62% (NS)	60%	60% (**)	44%
Definitely will be active in future	71% (NS)	76%	75% (NS)	76%
Mean party ticket activity index score	2.26 (NS)	2.38	2.20 (**)	1.69

NOTE: The statistical test used was the significance of the tau correlation between prenomination candidate choice and activity. In the case of general election voting choice, I report the chi-square test on the relationship between the nominal five-category variable and prenomination choice (although only the percentages for two categories, "Voted for nominee" and "Voted for Anderson," are reported). For the comparisons of mean number of activities, the *t* test was employed.

**p* < .10.

***p* < .05.

****p* < .01.

NS, *p* ≥ .10, correlation considered not significant.

difference which may have resulted from greater divisiveness on the Democratic side. There are also some indications that Bush Republicans were less loyal to their party's nominee than Kennedy partisans were to Carter, although the differences in activity levels are slight and do not extend to voting behavior.

At the subpresidential level, there are marked differences between the parties, particularly in the Senate race. Kennedy loyalists apparently rebounded from their disappointment in the Carter nomination to participate actively in John Culver's campaign to hold his Senate seat against his Republican challenger, Charles Grassley. Indeed, in the Senate campaign the Kennedy supporters appear to have been more involved than the Carter partisans. Bush supporters were significantly less active in the Grassley campaign than were the Reagan activists. They were also less involved in the six Iowa House campaigns, and they appear to have been less supportive of the Iowa GOP than their Reagan counterparts.

One important difference between the Iowa parties in 1980 may account for the fact that Bush partisans tended not to participate in the GOP Senate race while Kennedy supporters did become involved on behalf of John Culver. Culver, as the incumbent, was popular among Iowa Democrats, and therefore had faced no primary challenge to his renomination. On the Republican side, however, there was a primary contest between Charles Grassley, representing the conservative wing of the GOP, and the relatively moderate Tom Stoner. Grassley was an easy winner in that race, but many of the activists who supported Bush for the presidential nomination also had preferred Stoner in the Senate primary (τ - $c = .53$). Thus, it is not surprising to discover, for example, that Republicans preferring Stoner were less active in the Senate campaign than were Republican activists preferring Grassley (26 percent to 77 percent) and that they were less likely to contribute money to the GOP Senate candidate (27 percent to 66 percent). The question is, Does the fact that Bush supporters also tended to prefer Tom Stoner in the Republican Senate primary account for the lower levels of involvement among Bush partisans in the Senate race?

The data in Table 2 demonstrate that the lower levels of participation in the Grassley campaign among Bush supporters cannot be explained completely as a residue of the Grassley-Stoner primary fight. There is a clear effect of the GOP Senate primary campaign on participation in the 1980 Senate election: Bush supporters who had preferred Stoner were less likely to be active for Grassley than were the Bush supporters who had preferred Grassley. Similarly, the relatively few Stoner partisans who preferred Reagan over Bush for president were less active in the Senate campaign for Grassley than were the Reagan partisans who supported Grassley over Stoner. But the differences in support for the Grassley candidacy between the Bush and Reagan camps remain significant and strong even when preferences relevant to the Stoner-Grassley primary fight are controlled. So far, then, the evidence suggests that divisiveness in the prenomination campaign between Bush and Reagan did intrude on other races in Iowa, including the successful Grassley campaign to wrest the Senate seat from John Culver.

TABLE 2

Comparison of Prenomination Presidential and Senatorial Preference on
Involvement in the GOP Senate Campaign

	Senate Primary Preference					
	Stoner			Grassley		
	Presidential Preference			Presidential Preference		
	Bush	Reagan		Bush	Reagan	
	(N = 72)	(N = 9)		(N = 54)	(N = 128)	
Active in Senate campaign	24%	(**)	56%	65%	(***)	83%
Contributed money to Senate campaign	22%	(***)	67%	52%	(***)	72%

NOTE: The statistical test is the significance of the tau correlation between presidential candidate preference and Senate campaign activity.

** $p < .05$.

*** $p < .01$.

The Effects of Ideology

The effects of ideology are of particular interest in assessing the relationship between the prenomination and the general election campaigns. Ideological differences within a party's coalition may give rise to different candidacies for the nomination. An open process which encourages highly visible campaigning by candidates and which emphasizes the ideological tensions within the party may add to the divisive effects which result from the purely personal loyalties activists may feel for the candidates. Moreover, ideology may help account for differences between the Iowa parties in Senate campaign activity levels among supporters of the presidential losers. The Democratic incumbent, John Culver, was a Kennedy protégé in the Senate with a voting record very similar to that of the Massachusetts Senator.⁶ Kennedy loyalists, most of whom were relatively liberal, may have been able to rebound from their disappointment in the presidential nomination race because they were offered ideological relief in the form of the Culver candidacy. Bush supporters also differed ideologically from Reagan partisans within the GOP, but they were not offered an ideologically compatible candidate to support for the Senate since Charles Grassley was clearly identified with the conservative wing of the party.⁷ Thus, while Kennedy Democrats could pursue their ideological interests by working for Culver (even as they tended to remain relatively inactive

⁶ Culver's composite ADA rating was 85 for the three years between 1976 and 1978 (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews, 1979, p. 309). This rating was a bit lower than Kennedy's 95 for the same years, but both Culver and Kennedy were open about their mutual personal and political ties.

⁷ Grassley's ADA scores in the House of Representatives between 1976 and 1978 were 15, 15, and 5 (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews, 1979, p. 305).

on Carter's behalf), Bush Republicans had no ideological alternative at either the presidential or senatorial levels.

The prenomination wave of the survey indicates that ideology was related to candidate preference in both parties. An ideological proximity measure was calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference between the respondent's position on the five-point ideology question and his or her perception of the candidate's position on the same scale. Among Democrats closer ideologically to President Carter, 92 percent preferred him to Senator Kennedy, while 63 percent who perceived themselves closer to Kennedy preferred him over the president. Similarly, 86 percent of the Republicans closer to Reagan preferred him to George Bush, while 75 percent of those closer to Bush preferred him to Reagan. These effects of ideology carried over into the general election where Democrats ideologically closer to Carter were more active on his behalf than were the Democratic activists closer to Kennedy. The same holds for Republicans, and is evident in the senatorial race on the Republican side as well. For example, 66 percent of those closer to Reagan said they were involved in the Senate campaign, whereas only 37 percent of those closer to Bush were involved in the Senate race. It is therefore entirely plausible that Kennedy and Bush supporters were less active in the fall presidential campaigns (and the Bush faction was less involved in the Grassley Senate effort) because of ideological differences with the nominee, rather than out of personal loyalty to the defeated nomination candidate or as a result of the divisive character of the nomination campaign.

Table 3 presents an analysis which permits us to observe the effects of pre-convention candidate preference on general election activity with ideological proximity controlled.⁸ I have presented the activity variables which showed at least some relationship to candidate preference in Table 1, save the activity indexes. A multivariate analysis of these indexes is presented below.

Participation in the presidential campaign remains significantly related to prenomination candidate choice in Table 3 even with ideology taken into account and despite the small number of cases in some cells. Nonetheless, some effect of ideology is visible, although it is not consistent. Among Bush Republicans who saw themselves closer to Reagan before the Detroit convention, 60 percent said they were involved in his campaign, whereas only 36 percent of the Bush supporters closer ideologically to Bush than to Reagan said they were involved. Similarly, liberal Carter supporters (i.e., those Democrats who preferred Carter even though they were closer ideologically to Kennedy) were less likely to contribute money to the Carter campaign than their fellow supporters of the president who were more conservative (47 percent to 64 percent). Despite these examples of an effect of ideology, the major finding at the presidential level is that pre-nomination candidate preference remains significantly related to general election activity with ideology controlled.

⁸ All of the analyses which follow have been replicated using the respondent's self-placement alone as the indicator of ideology, and the findings are virtually identical.

TABLE 3

Prenomination Candidate Choice, Ideological Proximity, and General Election Activity

Activity	Democrats				Republicans			
	Ideologically Closer to:				Ideologically Closer to:			
	Carter		Kennedy		Reagan		Bush	
	Prenomination Choice Carter (N = 139)	Prenomination Choice Kennedy (N = 12)	Prenomination Choice Carter (N = 47)	Prenomination Choice Kennedy (N = 133)	Prenomination Choice Reagan (N = 89)	Prenomination Choice Bush (N = 15)	Prenomination Choice Reagan (N = 18)	Prenomination Choice Bush (N = 108)
<i>Presidential Level</i>								
Involved in campaign	71% (**)	42%	67%	44% (***)	84%	60% (**)	72%	36% (***)
Gave money to campaign	64% (**)	33%	47%	36% (*)	72%	33% (***)	67%	32% (***)
Voted for nominee	89% (***)	58%	90%	64% (***)	97%	87% (**)	94%	72% (**)
Voted for Anderson	4%	33%	7%	19%	1%	7%	6%	17%
<i>Subpresidential Level</i>								
Involved in Senate campaign	77% (*)	58%	78%	90% (**)	81%	53% (***)	78%	37% (***)
Gave money to Senate campaign	68% (NS)	67%	76%	84% (NS)	74%	27% (***)	68%	36% (***)
Involved in House campaign	69% (*)	50%	69%	77% (NS)	72%	73% (NS)	61%	45% (NS)
Gave money to House campaign	68% (*)	50%	65%	67% (NS)	64%	53% (NS)	56%	48% (NS)
<i>Indicators of Partisan Support</i>								
Gave money to party	68% (NS)	58%	72%	66% (NS)	75%	73% (NS)	63%	62% (NS)
Rated party "very favorable"	63% (NS)	67%	58%	56% (NS)	53%	33% (*)	69%	43% (**)

NOTE: The statistical test used was the significance of the tau correlation between prenomination candidate choice and activity. In the case of general election voting choice, I report the chi-square test on the relationship between the nominal five-category variable and prenomination choice (although only the percentages for two categories, "Voted for nominee" and "Voted for Anderson," are reported). For the comparisons of mean number of activities, the *t* test was employed.

p* < .10. *p* < .05. ****p* < .01. NS, *p* ≥ .10, correlation considered not significant.

The other major finding in Table 3 is a clear indication that Bush partisans supported Grassley for the Senate at a lower rate than Reagan adherents, regardless of which ideological wing of the party they were in. Moderate Republicans who had supported Reagan were very nearly as active on behalf of Grassley as their more conservative copartisans. Conservatives who had preferred Bush before the convention were more likely to be active in support of Grassley than the more moderate members of the Bush faction, but they were certainly no more likely to contribute money to his campaign.

The effects of prenomination choice appear only sporadically in the rest of the table. Bush supporters in the moderate wing of the party appear to have been less active in House campaigns and to have contributed money less often, though in neither case is the difference statistically significant. There also remains a significant tendency for Bush supporters in both ideological camps within the GOP to rate the party less favorably than Reagan supporters. Taken as a whole, the data in Table 3 suggest the effects of the Republican nomination campaign in Iowa were more extensive than in the Democratic Party. Coming in second at the top of the ticket apparently was small consolation to the Bush supporters, and their loss tempered their enthusiasm for fall activity in the GOP almost without regard to their ideological leanings.

A Multivariate Analysis of General Election Activity

The analysis of prenomination candidate preference controlling for the effects of ideology is particularly important because of the persistent claim among observers of the process that ideology is a central motivating factor among activists. The findings reported in Table 3 are consistent with other recent work suggesting presidential activists may not be as "purist" or "amateur" as earlier studies have claimed (Stone and Abramowitz, in press [1983]). In addition to ideology, however, other factors must be taken into account to provide a full assessment of the effect of prenomination candidate choice on postnomination political participation among presidential activists. A multivariate analysis of the indexes of participation in the Iowa presidential, senatorial, and general party campaigns will help to pin down more precisely the effects of prenomination choice.

The effect of attachment to the party organization is of interest in determining whether supporting a losing candidate in the nomination campaign depresses participation during the general election. Presidential nomination campaigns have the potential to draw into the political process large numbers of neophytes with little political experience and no particularly strong attachment to the party organizations. That activists such as these who have supported a nomination loser do not become active for the party's nominee would hardly be surprising. Neither could it be said to harm the parties or even the campaign of the nominee since the nonparticipation of such activists might be considered normal in the absence of a candidate whom they find especially attractive. If student supporters of, say, Eugene McCarthy in 1968 sat out the campaign because their candidate failed to receive the nomination, can it be argued the Democratic Party (or Hubert Hum-

phrey's campaign) was hurt? In the absence of McCarthy's attempt at the nomination, many of his supporters would simply have remained inactive during *both* stages of the process.

The matter may be put another way. Past political activity and attachment to the party organization should help explain participation in the 1980 general election period. Does this expected relationship account for the association we have observed between prenomination preference and political activity during the general election? For example, among Republican activists there was a relationship between strength of party identification and nomination candidate preference (57 percent of the strong Republicans preferred Reagan over Bush, while only 31 percent of the weak identifiers preferred Reagan to Bush). In both parties, strong identifiers were substantially more likely to be active in the general election campaign. The multivariate analysis presented in Table 4 is intended to demonstrate that nomination preferences in both parties significantly affected participation among Iowa activists, independent of the effects of ideology, past levels of political activism, and attachment to the party organization.

The independent variables include the familiar prenomination candidate preference and relative ideological proximity to the two major contenders within the party. As measures of attachment to the party organization, I include strength of party identification and whether or not the activist has held party office. The measure of past political activity includes precisely the same activities included in the dependent indexes of political activity. For the Democrats, I add a measure comparing evaluations of the two candidates for the Senate, John Culver and Charles Grassley, in the equations predicting activity in the Senate campaign and for the general party ticket.⁹ Since there was a primary race for the GOP Senate nomination, I have also included in the Republican Senate and "ticket" equations an intraparty comparison of evaluations of the two primary candidates, Stoner and Grassley. These variables are coded such that the regression equation intercept provides an estimate of the average rate of participation among activists who were indifferent on the candidate and ideology comparisons and who had been inactive in past campaigns, had never held party office, and were weak or independent identifiers.¹⁰

⁹ Respondents were asked their opinions about several state and local political leaders (see appendix for exact wording), and the variable used here is the difference between the rating for Culver and the rating for Grassley. A negative score means the respondent favored Culver over Grassley, while a positive score means the activist favored Grassley over Culver. This is the only interparty comparison included in the analysis. Elsewhere (Stone, 1983) I examine in depth the effects of general election presidential candidate and party comparisons along with the prenomination variables analyzed in this article. Including these general election effects does not modify the conclusions reported here since the effect of prenomination candidate choice on the presidential activity index is statistically significant, and remains stronger than the general election comparisons.

¹⁰ The coding of the independent variables is as follows:

<i>Presidential preference:</i>	- 1	Prefers Kennedy/Bush over Carter/Reagan
	1	Prefers Carter/Reagan over Kennedy/Bush
<i>Ideology:</i>	- 1	Closer to Kennedy/Bush than to Carter/Reagan

In both parties, prenomination candidate preference is the single most important predictor of postnomination participation in the presidential campaign (see Table 4). With ideology, past activity in campaigns, and attachment to the party organization all controlled, there remains clear evidence of candidate-based divisiveness in both parties, and the effect on the Republican side appears to be stronger than among the Democrats. Presidential preference had no significant effect on Democratic participation in the Senate race, nor did it extend to broader participation for the Democratic ticket in Iowa. Among Republicans, however, prenomination presidential preference did affect participation in the Grassley campaign, even with the divisive effects of the GOP Senate primary controlled. To be sure, the primary fight between Stoner and Grassley had a slightly stronger effect on participation in the Senate campaign, but the evidence clearly demonstrates that Bush Republicans participated significantly less in the GOP Senate race, not primarily out of distaste for the conservative candidate's ideology but as a result of the lingering aftertaste of their loss at the presidential convention.¹¹ That Grassley was able to unseat the Democratic Senator indicates he overcame the significant disadvantages within his party of a divisive primary fight for the nomination and the intrusion of the Bush-Reagan contest.

<i>Ideology (continued):</i>	0	Equally close to both contenders in party
	1	Closer to Carter/Reagan than to Kennedy/Bush
<i>Strength of party identification:</i>	0	Independent/weak identifier
	1	Strong identifier
<i>Officeholding:</i>	0	Never held party office
	1	Has held, or is holding, party office
<i>Past campaign activity:</i>		Number of ways respondent has participated in past campaigns
<i>Interparty Senate preference:</i>	-1	Culver-Grassley rating favors Culver
	0	Culver-Grassley ratings equal
	1	Culver-Grassley rating favors Grassley
<i>Intraparty Senate primary preference:</i>	-1	Stoner-Grassley rating favors Stoner
	0	Stoner-Grassley ratings equal
	1	Stoner-Grassley rating favors Grassley

Because the dependent variables are right-skewed, and the R^2 values are not high, I experimented with several ways of handling this, including log transformations. The result was some improvement in the standard errors of the regression coefficients and a very slight improvement in the fit, but these small gains did not appear to outweigh the benefit of retaining the natural coding of the variables. All independent variables were measured during the first-wave survey, while, of course, the dependent variables result from the second wave. Analysis of such postnomination measures as ideology indicates that they are very highly correlated with the prenomination measures, though there is some change between the two stages. When second-wave measures are substituted for preconvention indicators, no improvement in the fit is achieved, and the clear causal precedence which is protected by using the prenomination measures is lost.

¹¹ In some respects, including the interparty Senate candidate comparisons in the equations amounts to a surrogate measure of ideology since the candidates were so sharply different in that respect (see nn. 6 and 7 above). The effect of ideology is reduced somewhat when the interparty Senate comparison is introduced, but in no case is it reduced from a significant to an insignificant effect.

TABLE 4
Predictors of Postconvention Campaign Participation

Independent Variable	Democrats (<i>N</i> = 386)								
	Participation in Presidential Campaign			Participation in Senate Campaign			Participation for the Ticket		
	<i>b</i>	(<i>p</i>)	Beta	<i>b</i>	(<i>p</i>)	Beta	<i>b</i>	(<i>p</i>)	Beta
Prenomination presidential preference	.33	(.00)	.21	-.11	(.32)	-.06	.01	(.92)	.01
Ideology	.21	(.01)	.13	-.07	(.56)	-.03	-.10	(.46)	-.04
Strength of party identification	.25	(.19)	.07	.31	(.16)	.07	.65	(.01)	.13
Officeholding	.33	(.06)	.10	.38	(.08)	.09	.71	(.00)	.15
Past campaign activity	.10	(.01)	.14	.26	(.00)	.29	.30	(.00)	.28
Interparty Senate preference	—	—	—	-.60	(.02)	-.12	-.48	(.10)	-.08
Intercept		0.16			0.11			0.04	
Sample mean rate of participation		0.94			1.93			2.38	
Multiple <i>R</i>		.37			.44			.47	

Independent Variable	Republicans (<i>N</i> = 276)								
	Participation in Presidential Campaign			Participation in Senate Campaign			Participation for the Ticket		
	<i>b</i>	(<i>p</i>)	Beta	<i>b</i>	(<i>p</i>)	Beta	<i>b</i>	(<i>p</i>)	Beta
Prenomination presidential preference	.44	(.00)	.29	.39	(.00)	.22	.11	(.44)	.06
Ideology	.10	(.41)	.06	.05	(.71)	.03	-.02	(.91)	-.01
Strength of party identification	-.02	(.95)	-.00	-.11	(.65)	-.03	.12	(.68)	.03
Officeholding	.07	(.77)	.02	.07	(.80)	.02	.41	(.17)	.08
Past campaign activity	.18	(.00)	.23	.25	(.00)	.28	.39	(.00)	.39
Interparty Senate preference	—	—	—	.11	(.65)	.03	.98	(.00)	.26
Intraparty Senate primary preference	—	—	—	.54	(.00)	.26	-.32	(.06)	-.14
Intercept		0.27			0.22			0.36	
Sample mean rate of participation		0.80			1.16			1.94	
Multiple <i>R</i>		.43			.55			.50	

NOTE: See n. 10 for the coding of the variables.

The remaining variables in the analysis are included primarily as controls to validate the effects of prenomination candidate preference, but there are some interesting patterns in the data. The effects of strength of party identification and party officeholding increase as the visibility of the election decreases for the Democrats (though not for the Republicans), a pattern which is duplicated in both

parties for the effects of past campaign activity. This supports an observation commonly made among students of the process: it is easier to draw political neophytes into a relatively visible campaign such as for the presidency than it is to get them active on behalf of the party in less glamorous campaigns for the statehouse or county commissioner. For these lower offices, it is the people who have always been active and those who have committed themselves to the party organization who are the mainstays of the campaign.¹² The evidence in Table 4 demonstrates that these races remain unaffected by the cleavages stimulated by prenomination presidential politics, though of course divisive primaries at lower levels may intrude on party activity for these nominees.

Summary and Conclusion

The results of this research have consistently pointed to an effect of pre-nomination candidate loyalty on general election campaign involvement. For the Democrats, that effect was limited to inhibiting participation in the Carter campaign against Reagan, but for the Republicans it extended beyond the GOP campaign for the White House to the Grassley Senate campaign. What are we to make of these findings? Clearly they represent the effects of the tension between the first and second stages of the presidential selection process. This research provides the first precise estimates of this tension, at least insofar as it affects presidential activists after the party nominations are settled.¹³ Given the literature which emphasizes the ideological and uncompromising nature of contemporary activists, we may be surprised that so many of the Kennedy and Bush supporters transferred their loyalties to their former opponent for the nomination. This combined with the fact that ideology did not have much of an independent effect on general election involvement suggests that ideological factions within the party may not be as troublesome as sometimes argued in the literature.

The fact that the major factional tension within the party is linked to candidate loyalty rather than to ideology may be small comfort to those worried by recent developments in the presidential nomination process. Preconvention candidate loyalty undeniably has an effect on postconvention behavior, and it may have longer term effects on partisan involvement by supporters of the losing can-

¹² Note that while the effects of organizational loyalty and past activity increase as the visibility of the campaign decreases, the average rate of participation also goes up. That is due in part to the fact that state and local campaigns are simply much more accessible to activists than national campaigns. Some kinds of involvement in the presidential campaign (e.g., planning strategy) will not be open to many activists on the state or local level, whereas campaigns for county or state offices will require their services. But the activists surveyed in this study were all presidential activists: i.e., they attended a state presidential convention in order to participate in the selection of national convention delegates. That they were on average quite active in other campaigns as well should be encouraging to those who wish to see the party organizations maintained.

¹³ Lengle (1980) reports a consistent effect of voting for the nomination loser in the 1972 and 1976 presidential primaries on subsequent voting in the general election: "Primary voters showed staunch loyalty to the party if it nominated their first choice, and a strong propensity to defect if the party nod went to someone else" (p. 272).

didate. These negative effects were evident—indeed, they were more evident—in the Republican Party where the losers were granted a consolation prize. Throughout its history, there have been many disparaging and colorful remarks made by vice presidents about their job, but it is traditionally a means of balancing the ticket to placate potentially disgruntled members of the coalition. That the Bush partisans remained at least as removed from the Reagan effort as the Kennedy supporters were from the Carter campaign may be evidence of a “new politics” where such balancing and compromise within the party is less effective.

These data from the 1980 campaign cannot directly address the question of long-term change in the parties. We cannot know, for example, whether the effects we have observed are greater or less in magnitude than those we might have uncovered among, say, Humphrey and Lodge activists in 1960. Probably variations would be evident both over time and with different contexts, were the data available. It is possible, for example, that Bush’s intense fall campaign in Iowa stimulated deep-seated loyalties among his supporters there, and that data from other states might show a positive effect of the ticket balancing strategy. Unfortunately, data from other states with different political contexts, and from earlier times, are not available for comparison. Perhaps other scholars concerned with the presidential selection process will build into their designs ways of gathering data appropriate to the analysis of activists’ behavior before and after the national conventions. Only then will we have a complete picture of the tensions on parties created by the two stages.

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APPENDIX

Survey Design and Questions Asked

The Prenomination Survey

Questionnaires were distributed to all delegates at the Iowa Democratic and Republican state presidential conventions in June 1980. Precise attendance figures were not available from the political parties, but both parties estimated the turnout to the conventions at about 2,400 delegates. The Democratic survey resulted in 1,673 usable questionnaires (for an estimated response rate of about 70 percent) while the Republicans returned 1,107 usable questionnaires (for an estimated response rate of about 46 percent). The purpose of surveying the conventions was not to say anything about the conventions per se. Rather, the delegates to the conventions provided convenient samples of presidential activists participating in the early stages of the prenomination campaigns. The delegates to the Iowa conventions had participated in the precinct caucuses held on 21 January 1980 and had been selected to the state conventions at county conventions held in March and April. Strictly speaking, the data do not consist of samples of the conventions so much as an imperfect census of the conventions. I report the statistical significance of the results as an additional check which takes into account the sometimes rather small sample size under analysis.

The questions used from the prenomination survey are as follows:

a. *Presidential Preference*: “Please rank your preferences for President among the following candidates from (1) most favored, to (6) least favored.” The presidential preference measure used throughout the analysis was a simple comparison of these rankings: if a Democrat ranked Carter above Kennedy, he or she was scored as preferring Carter, and so on.

b. *Ideology*: "How would you describe your own political philosophy?" Responses ranged on a five-point scale from "very liberal" through "very conservative." Elsewhere on the questionnaire, respondents were asked, "How would you rate the political philosophy of each of the following presidential candidates?" They were presented with the same five-point scale, and rated six candidates.

c. *Party Attachment*: The strength of party identification resulted from answers to the question "How would you describe your own party affiliation in national politics?" Answers ranged on a seven-point scale from "strong Democrat" to "strong Republican." The officeholding dummy variable resulted from answers to "Please indicate which, if any, of the following positions you now hold or have held in the past? (Check as many as apply.)" The offices included were member of a local party committee, chair of a local party committee, other local party office, member of congressional district party committee, member of state central committee.

d. *Past Campaign Activity*: "Which of the following activities, if any, have you performed in political campaigns?" Activities included in calculating the past activity index were clerical work, door-to-door canvassing, telephone canvassing, arranging coffees or socials, fundraising, writing ads or press releases, and planning strategy.

e. *Inter- and Intraparty Senate Preference*: "Please indicate your opinion about each of the following state and national political figures." Among leaders included were John Culver, Charles Grassley, and Tom Stoner. Respondents rated each leader on a five-point scale ranging from "very favorable" through "very unfavorable."

The Postelection Wave

Respondents to the prenomination survey were offered the opportunity to request a report summarizing the results from the survey. If they requested that report, they were asked to provide their name and address. Sixty-seven percent of the Democrats and 45 percent of the Republicans provided names and addresses. Immediately following the election, these respondents were mailed the summary report along with a questionnaire asking about their involvement in the general election and their attitudes toward the candidates and parties. The response rate for both parties was just over 30 percent of those originally surveyed. Of the Democrats providing their names and addresses on the first questionnaire, 46 percent responded to the postelection mail survey ($N = 505$), while 67 percent of the Republicans who gave their addresses responded to the second-wave instrument ($N = 335$).

Because of the low response rate to the postelection survey, a chi-square goodness-of-fit test was run on a number of variables of interest to this study, testing the hypothesis that those responding to the second wave are a random subset of those responding to the prenomination survey. Analysis of the principal independent variable, candidate choice, is reassuring. Among the Democrats, the post-election sample is almost perfectly representative of the prenomination sample. Among Republicans, Bush partisans responded to the postelection survey at a slightly higher rate than the Reagan supporters (47 percent of the prenomination sample favored Bush over Reagan while 53 percent of the postelection sample favored Bush on the same prenomination questions), but the difference between the two waves was not statistically significant at the .10 level. On several other variables significant, though still small, differences were detected. Among the Democrats, respondents ideologically closer to Kennedy on the prenomination measures were significantly more likely to respond to the postelection survey (42 percent of the prenomination sample were closer to Kennedy; 49 percent of the postelection sample had been closer to Kennedy), a difference significant at the .05 level. Republicans responding to the second wave were significantly more likely to have held party office (74 to 80 percent), and there was a slight tendency ($\tau = .10$) for respondents to the second wave to have been more active in past elections. On no other variable tested was there a significant difference between the postelection and prenomination samples.

Questions included from the postelection survey are:

a. *Activity*: "Please indicate which of the following general election campaigns you were actively involved in during the fall of 1980 (check as many as apply)." The activity indexes were constructed from answers to the question "Which of the following activities, if any, did you perform on behalf of the campaigns listed below, between the summer conventions and the November election?" Activities

listed were clerical work, door-to-door canvassing, telephone canvassing, arranging coffees or socials, fund raising, writing ads or press releases, and planning strategy.

b. *Voting Behavior*: "How did you vote in the 1980 presidential election?" Responses were, "Reagan," "Carter," "Anderson," "Other," "Didn't Vote."

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